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Abstract—We investigate the secure connectivity of wire-
less sensor networks under the pairwise key distribution
scheme of Chan et al.. Unlike recent work which was
carried out under the assumption of full visibility, here we
assume a (simplified) communication model where unreli-
able wireless links are represented as on/off channels. We
present conditions on how to scale the model parameters so
that the network i) has no secure node which is isolated and
ii) is securely connected, both with high probability when
the number of sensor nodes becomes large. The results are
given in the form of zero-one laws, and exhibit significant
differences with corresponding results in the full visibility
case. Through simulations these zero-one laws are shown to
be valid also under a more realistic communication model,
i.e., the disk model.
Keywords: Wireless sensor networks, Security, Key predis-
tribution, Random graphs, Connectivity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are distributed collections
of sensors with limited capabilities for computations and
wireless communications. It is envisioned [1] that WSNs
will be used in a wide range of applications areas such as
healthcare (e.g. patient monitoring), military operations (e.g.,
battlefield surveillance) and homes (e.g., home automation and
monitoring). These WSNs will often be deployed in hostile
environments where communications can be monitored, and
nodes are subject to capture and surreptitious use by an adver-
sary. Under such circumstances, cryptographic protection will
be needed to ensure secure communications, and to support
functions such as sensor-capture detection, key revocation and
sensor disabling.
Unfortunately, many security schemes developed for general
network environments do not take into account the unique
features of WSNs: Public key cryptography is not feasible
computationally because of the severe limitations imposed on
the physical memory and power consumption of the individual
sensors. Traditional key exchange and distribution protocols
are based on trusting third parties, and this makes them inad-
equate for large-scale WSNs whose topologies are unknown
prior to deployment. We refer the reader to the papers [6],
[11], [20] for discussions of the security challenges in WSN
settings.
Random key predistribution schemes were introduced to
address some of these difficulties. The idea of randomly
assigning secure keys to sensor nodes prior to network de-
ployment was first introduced by Eschenauer and Gligor [11].
Since then, many competing alternatives to the Eschenauer
and Gligor (EG) scheme have been proposed; see [6] for a
detailed survey of various key distribution schemes for WSNs.
With so many schemes available, a basic question arises as to
how they compare with each other. Answering this question
passes through a good understanding of the properties and
performance of the schemes under consideration, and this can
be achieved in a number of ways. The approach we use here
considers random graph models naturally induced by a given
scheme, and then develops the scaling laws corresponding to
desirable network properties, e.g., absence of secure nodes
which are isolated, secure connectivity, etc. This is done
with the aim of deriving guidelines to dimension the scheme,
namely adjust its parameters so that these properties occur
with high probability as the number of nodes becomes large.
To date, most of the efforts along these lines have been
carried out under the assumption of full visibility according
to which sensor nodes are all within communication range
of each other; more on this later: Under this assumption, the
EG scheme gives rise to a class of random graphs known
as random key graphs; relevant results are available in the
references [3], [8], [11], [18], [24]. The q-composite scheme
[7], a simple variation of the EG scheme, was investigated
by Bloznelis et al. [4] through an appropriate extension of
the random key graph model. Recently, Yag˘an and Makowski
have analyzed various random graphs induced by the random
pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan et al. [7]; see the
conference papers [25], [26].
To be sure, the full visibility assumption does away with
the wireless nature of the communication medium supporting
WSNs. In return, this simplification makes it possible to focus
on how randomization of the key distribution mechanism alone
affects the establishment of a secure network in the best of
circumstances, i..e., when there are no link failures. A common
criticism of this line of work is that by disregarding the
unreliability of the wireless links, the resulting dimensioning
2guidelines are likely to be too optimistic: In practice nodes
will have fewer neighbors since some of the communication
links may be impaired. As a result, the desired connectivity
properties may not be achieved if dimensioning is done
according to results derived under full visibility.
In this paper, in an attempt to go beyond full visibility,
we revisit the pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan et
al. [7] under more realistic assumptions that account for the
possibility that communication links between nodes may not
be available – This could occur due to the presence of physical
barriers between nodes or because of harsh environmental
conditions severely impairing transmission. To study such
situations, we introduce a simple communication model where
channels are mutually independent, and are either on or off. An
overall system model is then constructed by intersecting the
random graph model of the pairwise key distribution scheme
(under full visibility), with an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graph model
[5]. For this new random graph structure, we establish zero-
one laws for two basic (and related) graph properties, namely
graph connectivity and the absence of isolated nodes, as the
model parameters are scaled with the number of users – We
identify the critical thresholds and show that they coincide. To
the best of our knowledge, these full zero-one laws constitute
the first complete analysis of a key distribution scheme under
non-full visibility – Contrast this with the partial results by Yi
et al. [28] for the absence of isolated nodes (under additional
conditions) when the communication model is the disk model.
Although the communication model considered here may
be deemed simplistic, it does permit a complete analysis
of the issues of interest, with the results already yielding a
number of interesting observations: The obtained zero-one
laws differ significantly from the corresponding results in
the full visibility case [25]. Thus, the communication model
may have a significant impact on the dimensioning of the
pairwise distribution algorithm, and this points to the need
of possibly reevaluating guidelines developed under the full
visibility assumption. Furthermore, simulations suggest that
the zero-one laws obtained here for the on/off channel model
may still be useful in dimensioning the pairwise scheme under
the popular, and more realistic, disk model [12].
We also compare the results established here with well-
known zero-one laws for ER graphs [5]. In particular, we
show that the connectivity behavior of the model studied here
does not in general resemble that of the ER graphs. The
picture is somewhat more subtle for the results also imply
that if the channel is very poor, the model studied here indeed
behaves like an ER graph as far as connectivity is concerned.
The comparison with ER graphs is particularly relevant to
the analysis of key distribution schemes for WSNs: Indeed,
connectivity results for ER graphs have often been used in
the dimensioning and evaluation of key distribution schemes,
e.g., see the papers by Eschenauer and Gligor [11], Chan
et al. [7] and Hwang and Kim [13]. There it is a common
practice to assume that the random graph induced by the
particular key distribution scheme behaves like an ER graph
(although it is not strictly speaking an ER graph). As pointed
out by Di Pietro et al. [8] such an assumption is made without
any formal justification, and subsequent efforts to confirm its
validity have remained limited to this date: The EG scheme
has been analyzed by a number of authors [3], [8], [18], [24],
and as a result of these efforts it is now known that the ER
assumption does yield the correct results for both the absence
of isolated nodes and connectivity under the assumption of full
visibility. On the other hand the recent paper [25] shows that
the ER assumption is not valid for the pairwise key distribution
of Chan et al. [7]; see Section V-A for details.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we give precise definitions and implementation details of the
pairwise scheme of Chan et al. while Section III is devoted
to describing the model of interest. The main results of the
paper, namely Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2, are presented
in Section IV with an extensive discussion given in Section
V. The remaining sections, namely Sections VI through XIII,
are devoted to establishing the main results of the paper.
A word on notation and conventions in use: All limiting
statements, including asymptotic equivalences, are understood
with n going to infinity. The random variables (rvs) under
consideration are all defined on the same probability triple
(Ω,F ,P). Probabilistic statements are made with respect to
this probability measure P, and we denote the corresponding
expectation operator by E. Also, we use the notation =st to
indicate distributional equality. The indicator function of an
event E is denoted by 1 [E]. For any discrete set S we write
|S| for its cardinality. Also, for any pair of events E and F
we have
1 [E ∪ F ] = 1 [E] + 1 [F ]− 1 [E ∩ F ] . (1)
II. IMPLEMENTING PAIRWISE KEY DISTRIBUTION
SCHEMES
Interest in the random pairwise key predistribution scheme
of Chan et al. [7] stems from the following advantages over
the EG scheme: (i) Even if some nodes are captured, the
secrecy of the remaining nodes is perfectly preserved; (ii)
Unlike earlier schemes, this pairwise scheme enables both
node-to-node authentication and quorum-based revocation.
As in the conference papers [25], [26], we parametrize the
pairwise key distribution scheme by two positive integers n
and K such that K < n. There are n nodes, labelled i =
1, . . . , n, with unique ids Id1, . . . , Idn. Write N := {1, . . . n}
and set N−i := N − {i} for each i = 1, . . . , n. With node i
we associate a subset Γn,i of nodes selected at random from
N−i – We say that each of the nodes in Γn,i is paired to node
i. Thus, for any subset A ⊆ N−i, we require
P [Γn,i = A] =

(
n−1
K
)−1 if |A| = K
0 otherwise.
The selection of Γn,i is done uniformly amongst all subsets of
N−i which are of size exactly K . The rvs Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,n are
3assumed to be mutually independent so that
P [Γn,i = Ai, i = 1, . . . , n] =
n∏
i=1
P [Γn,i = Ai]
for arbitrary A1, . . . , An subsets of N−1, . . . ,N−n, respec-
tively.
Once this offline random pairing has been created, we
construct the key rings Σn,1, . . . ,Σn,n, one for each node,
as follows: Assumed available is a collection of nK distinct
cryptographic keys {ωi|ℓ, i = 1, . . . , n; ℓ = 1, . . . ,K}.
Fix i = 1, . . . , n and let ℓn,i : Γn,i → {1, . . . ,K} denote
a labeling of Γn,i. For each node j in Γn,i paired to i,
the cryptographic key ωi|ℓn,i(j) is associated with j. For
instance, if the random set Γn,i is realized as {j1, . . . , jK}
with 1 ≤ j1 < . . . < jK ≤ n, then an obvious labeling
consists in ℓn,i(jk) = k for each k = 1, . . . ,K with key
ωi|k associated with node jk. Of course other labeling are
possible, e.g., according to decreasing labels or according
to a random permutation. Finally, the pairwise key ω⋆n,ij =
[Idi|Idj |ωi|ℓn,i(j)] is constructed and inserted in the memory
modules of both nodes i and j. The key ω⋆n,ij is assigned
exclusively to the pair of nodes i and j, hence the terminology
pairwise distribution scheme. The key ring Σn,i of node i is
the set
Σn,i := {ω
⋆
n,ij , j ∈ Γn,i} ∪ {ω
⋆
n,ji, i ∈ Γn,j}. (2)
If two nodes, say i and j, are within communication range
of each other, then they can establish a secure link if at least
one of the events i ∈ Γn,j or j ∈ Γn,j is taking place. Both
events can take place, in which case the memory modules of
node i and j both contain the distinct keys ω⋆n,ij and ω⋆n,ji.
Finally, it is plain by construction that this scheme supports
node-to-node authentication.
III. THE MODEL
Under full visibility, this pairwise distribution scheme natu-
rally gives rise to the following class of random graphs: With
n = 2, 3, . . . and positive integer K < n, we say that the
distinct nodes i and j are K-adjacent, written i ∼K j, if and
only if they have at least one key in common in their key
rings, namely
i ∼K j iff Σn,i ∩ Σn,j 6= ∅. (3)
Let H(n;K) denote the undirected random graph on the
vertex set {1, . . . , n} induced by the adjacency notion (3);
this corresponds to modelling the pairwise distribution scheme
under full visibility. We have
P [i ∼K j] = λn(K) (4)
where λn(K) is the link assignment probability in H(n;K)
given by
λn(K) = 1−
(
1−
K
n− 1
)2
=
2K
n− 1
−
(
K
n− 1
)2
. (5)
As mentioned earlier, in this paper we seek to account
for the possibility that communication links between nodes
may not be available. To study such situations, we assume a
communication model that consists of independent channels
each of which can be either on or off. Thus, with p in (0, 1),
let {Bij(p), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} denote i.i.d. {0, 1}-valued rvs
with success probability p. The channel between nodes i and
j is available (resp. up) with probability p and unavailable
(resp. down) with the complementary probability 1− p.
Distinct nodes i and j are said to be B-adjacent, written
i ∼B j, if Bij(p) = 1. The notion of B-adjacency defines
the standard ER graph G(n; p) on the vertex set {1, . . . , n}.
Obviously,
P [i ∼ j]B = p.
The random graph model studied here is obtained by
intersecting the random pairwise graph H(n;K) with the ER
graph G(n; p). More precisely, the distinct nodes i and j are
said to be adjacent, written i ∼ j, if and only they are both
K-adjacent and B-adjacent, namely
i ∼ j iff
Σn,i ∩Σn,j 6= ∅
and
Bij(p) = 1.
(6)
The resulting undirected random graph defined on the vertex
set {1, . . . , n} through this notion of adjacency is denoted
H ∩G(n;K, p).
Throughout the collections of rvs {Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,n} and
{Bij(p), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} are assumed to be independent, in
which case the edge occurrence probability in H ∩G(n;K, p)
is given by
P [i ∼ j] = p · P [i ∼K j] = pλn(K). (7)
IV. THE RESULTS
To fix the terminology, we refer to any mapping K : N0 →
N0 as a scaling (for random pairwise graphs) provided it
satisfies the natural conditions
Kn < n, n = 1, 2, . . . . (8)
Similarly, any mapping p : N0 → (0, 1) defines a scaling for
ER graphs.
To lighten the notation we often group the parameters K
and p into the ordered pair θ ≡ (K, p). Hence, a mapping
θ : N0 → N0 × (0, 1) defines a scaling for the intersection
graph H ∩G(n; θ) provided the condition (8) holds on the
first component.
The results will be expressed in terms of the threshold
function τ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] defined by
τ(p) =

1 if p = 0
2
1− log(1−p)
p
if 0 < p < 1
0 if p = 1.
(9)
It is easy to check that this threshold function is continuous
on its entire domain of definition; see Figure 3.
4A. Absence of isolated nodes
The first result gives a zero-one law for the absence of
isolated nodes.
Theorem 4.1: Consider scalings K : N0 → N0 and p :
N0 → (0, 1) such that
pn
(
2Kn −
K2n
n− 1
)
∼ c logn, n = 1, 2, . . . (10)
for some c > 0. If limn→∞ pn = p⋆ for some p⋆ in [0, 1], then
we have
lim
n→∞
P
[
H ∩G(n; θn) contains
no isolated nodes
]
=

0 if c < τ(p⋆)
1 if c > τ(p⋆).
(11)
The condition (10) on the scaling N0 → (0, 1) × N0 will
often be used in the equivalent form
pn
(
2Kn −
K2n
n− 1
)
= cn log n, n = 1, 2, . . . (12)
with the sequence c : N0 → R+ satisfying limn→∞ cn = c.
B. Connectivity
An analog of Theorem 4.1 also holds for the property of
graph connectivity.
Theorem 4.2: Consider scalings K : N0 → N0 and p :
N0 → (0, 1) such that (10) holds for some c > 0. If
limn→∞ pn = p
⋆ for some p⋆ in [0, 1], then we have
lim
n→∞
P [H ∩G(n; θn) is connected]
=

0 if c < τ(p⋆)
1 if c > τ(p⋆)
(13)
where the threshold τ(p⋆) is given by (9).
Comparing Theorem 4.2 with Theorem 4.1, we see that
the class of random graphs studied here provides one more
instance where the zero-one laws for absence of isolated
nodes and connectivity coincide, viz. ER graphs [5], random
geometric graphs [19] or random key graphs [3], [18], [24].
A case of particular interest arises when p⋆ > 0 since
requiring (10) now amounts to(
2Kn −
K2n
n− 1
)
∼
c
p⋆
logn (14)
for some c > 0. Any scaling K : N0 → N0 which behaves
like (14) must necessarily satisfy Kn = o(n), and it is easy
to see that requiring (10) is equivalent to
Kn ∼ t logn (15)
for some t > 0 with c and t related by t = c2p⋆ . With
this reparametrization, Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 can be
summarized in the following simpler form:
Theorem 4.3: Consider scalings K : N0 → N0 and p :
N0 → (0, 1) such that limn→∞ pn = p⋆ > 0. Under the
condition (15) for some t > 0, we have
lim
n→∞
P [H ∩G(n; θn) contains no isolated nodes]
= lim
n→∞
P [H ∩G(n; θn) is connected]
=

0 if t < τ̂ (p⋆)
1 if t > τ̂ (p⋆)
(16)
where we have set
τ̂ (p) :=
τ(p)
2p
=
1
p− log(1− p)
, 0 < p < 1. (17)
This alternate formulation is particularly relevant for the
case pn = p
⋆ (in (0, 1)) for all n = 1, 2, . . ., which captures
situations when channel conditions are not affected by the
number of users. Such simplifications do not occur in the more
realistic case p⋆ = 0 which corresponds to the situation where
channel conditions are indeed influenced by the number of
users in the system – The more users in the network, the more
likely they will experience interferences from other users.
We now present numerical results that verify (16). In all
the simulations, we fix the number of nodes at n = 200.
We consider the channel parameters p = 0.2, p = 0.4,
p = 0.6, p = 0.8, and p = 1 (the full visibility case), while
varying the parameter K from 1 to 25. For each parameter pair
(K, p), we generate 500 independent samples of the graph
H ∩ G(n;K, p) and count the number of times (out of a
possible 500) that the obtained graphs i) have no isolated
nodes and ii) are connected. Dividing the counts by 500, we
obtain the (empirical) probabilities for the events of interest.
The results for connectivity are depicted in Figure 1, where
the curve fitting tool of MATLAB is used. It is easy to check
that for each value of p 6= 1, the connectivity threshold
matches the prescription (16), namely K = τ̂ (p) logn. It is
also seen that, if the channel is poor, i.e., if p is close to
zero, then the required value for K to ensure connectivity
can be much larger than the one in the full visibility case
p = 1. The results regarding the absence of node isolation are
depicted in Figure 2. For each value of p 6= 1, Figure 2 is
indistinguishable from Figure 1, with the difference between
the estimated probabilities of graph connectivity and absence
of isolated nodes being quite small, in agreement with (16).
V. DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS
A. Comparing with the full-visibility case
At this point the reader may wonder as to what form would
Theorem 4.2 take in the context of full visibility– In the setting
developed here this corresponds to p = 1 so that H ∩G(n; θ)
coincides with H(n;K); see the curve for p = 1 in Figure 1).
Relevant results for this case were obtained recently by the
authors in [25].
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Fig. 1. Probability that H∩G(n;K,p) is connected as a function of K for
p = 0.2, p = 0.4, p = 0.6, p = 0.8 and p = 1 with n = 200.
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
K
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
re
 e
xi
st
s 
n
o
 is
o
la
te
d
 n
o
d
e
s
 
 
p=0.2
p=0.4
p=0.6
p=0.8
p=1
Fig. 2. Probability that H∩G(n;K,p) has no isolated nodes as a function
of K for p = 0.2, p = 0.4, p = 0.6, p = 0.8 and p = 1 with n = 200.
This figure clearly resembles Figure 1 for all p 6= 1.
Theorem 5.1: For any K a positive integer, it holds that
lim
n→∞
P [H(n;K) is connected] =

0 if K = 1
1 if K ≥ 2.
The case where the parameter K is scaled with n is an easy
corollary of Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.2: For any scaling K : N0 → N0 such that
Kn ≥ 2 for all n sufficiently large, we have the one-law
lim
n→∞
P [H(n;Kn) is connected] = 1.
Each node in H(n;K) has degree at least K , so that no node
is ever isolated in H(n;K). This is in sharp contrast with the
model studied here, as reflected by the full zero-one law for
node isolation given in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 5.1 and its Corollary 5.2 together show that very
small values of K suffice to ensure asymptotically almost sure
(a.a.s.) connectivity of the random graph H(n;K). However,
these two results cannot be recovered from Theorem 4.2 whose
zero-one laws are derived under the assumption pn < 1 for all
n = 1, 2, . . .. Furthermore, even if the scaling p : N0 → (0, 1)
were to satisfy limn→∞ pn = 1, only the one-laws in Theorem
4.3 remain since τ(p⋆) = 0 (and τ̂ (p⋆) = 0) at p⋆ = 1.
Although this might perhaps be expected given the aforemen-
tioned absence of isolated nodes in H(n;K), the one-laws for
both the absence of isolated nodes and graph connectivity in
H ∩ G(n; θ) still require conditions on the behavior of the
scaling K : N0 → N0, namely (15) (whereas Corollary 5.2
does not).
B. Comparing H ∩G(n; θ) with ER graphs
In the original paper of Chan et al. [7] (as in the reference
[13]), the connectivity analysis of the pairwise scheme was
based on ER graphs [5] – It was assumed that the random
graph induced by the pairwise scheme under a communication
model (taken mostly to be the disk model [12]) behaves like an
ER graph; similar assumptions have been made in [11], [13]
when discussing the connectivity of the EG scheme. However,
this assumption was made without any formal justification.
Recently we have shown that the full visibility model H(n;K)
has major differences with an ER graph. For instance, the
edge assignments are (negatively) correlated in H(n;K) while
independent in ER graphs; see [25] for a detailed discussion
on the differences of H(n;K) and G(n; p). It is easy to verify
that the edge assignments in H ∩G(n; θ) are also negatively
correlated; see Section IX. Therefore, the models H(n;K)
and H ∩G(n; θ) cannot be equated with an ER graph, and
the results obtained in [25] and in this paper are not mere
consequences of classical results for ER graphs.
However, formal similarities do exist between H ∩G(n; θ)
and ER graphs. Recall the following well-known zero-one law
for ER graphs: For any scaling p : N0 → [0, 1] satisfying
pn ∼ c
logn
n
for some c > 0, it holds that
lim
n→∞
P [G(n; pn) is connected] =

0 if c < 1
1 if c > 1.
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Fig. 3. τ(p) vs p. Clearly τ(p⋆) = 1 only if limn→∞ pn = p⋆ = 0.
On the other hand, the condition (10) can be rephrased more
compactly as
pnλn(Kn) ∼ c
logn
n
, c > 0
with the results (11) and (13) unchanged. Hence, in both ER
graphs and H ∩G(n; θ), the zero-one laws can be expressed
as a comparison of the probability of link assignment against
the critical scaling lognn ; this is also the case for random
geometric graphs [19], and random key graphs [3], [18], [24].
But the condition c > τ(p⋆) that ensures a.a.s. connectivity in
H ∩G(n; θ) is not the same as the condition c > 1 for a.a.s.
connectivity in ER graphs; see Figure 3. Thus, the connectivity
behavior of the model H ∩ G(n; θ) is in general different
from that in an ER graph, and a “transfer” of the connectivity
results from ER graphs cannot be taken for granted. Yet, the
comparison becomes intricate when the channel is poor: The
connectivity behaviors of the two models do match in the
practically relevant case (for WSNs) limn→∞ pn = 0 since
τ(0) = 1.
C. A more realistic communication model
One possible extension of the work presented here would
be to consider a more realistic communication model; e.g.,
the popular disk model [12] which takes into account the geo-
graphical positions of the sensor nodes. For instance, assume
that the nodes are distributed over a bounded region D of the
plane. According to the disk model, nodes i and j located at
xi and xj , respectively, in D are able to communicate if
‖ xi − xj ‖< ρ (18)
where ρ > 0 is called the transmission range. When the node
locations are independently and randomly distributed over the
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Fig. 4. Probability that H ∩ G(n;K, ρ) is connected as a function of K .
The number of nodes is set to n = 200 and ρ is given by piρ2 = p.
region D, the graph induced under the condition (18) is known
as a random geometric graph [19], thereafter denoted G(n; ρ).
Under the disk model, studying the pairwise scheme of
Chan et al. amounts to analyzing the intersection of H(n;K)
and G(n; ρ), say H ∩G(n;K, ρ). A direct analysis of this
model seems to be very challenging; see below for more
on this. However, limited simulations already suggest that
the zero-one laws obtained here for H ∩G(n;K, p) have an
analog for the model H ∩G(n;K, ρ). To verify this, consider
200 nodes distributed uniformly and independently over a
folded unit square [0, 1]2 with toroidal (continuous) boundary
conditions. Since there are no border effects, it is easy to check
that
P [ ‖ xi − xj ‖< ρ ] = πρ
2, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
whenever ρ < 0.5. We match the two communication models
G(n; p) and G(n; ρ) by requiring πρ2 = p. Then, we use the
same procedure that produced Figure 1 to obtain the empirical
probability that H ∩G(n;K, ρ) is connected for various values
of K and p. The results are depicted in Figure 4 whose
resemblance with Figure 1 suggests that the connectivity
behaviors of the models H ∩G(n;K, p) and H ∩G(n;K, ρ)
are quite similar. This raises the possibility that the results
obtained here for the on/off communication model can also
be used for dimensioning the pairwise scheme under the disk
model.
A complete analysis of H ∩G(n;K, ρ) is likely to be very
challenging given the difficulties already encountered in the
analysis of similar problems. For example, the intersection of
random geometric graphs with ER graphs was considered in
[2], [28]. Although zero-one laws for graph connectivity are
7Fig. 5. An instantiation of ER graph G(n; p) with n = 50 and p = 0.2.–
The graph is connected.
available for each component random graph, the results for the
intersection model in [2], [28] were limited only to the absence
of isolated nodes; the connectivity problem is still open for that
model. Yi et al. [28] also consider the intersection of random
key graphs with random geometric graphs, but these results
are again limited to the property of node isolation. To the best
of our knowledge, Theorem 4.2 reported here constitutes the
only zero-one law for graph connectivity in a model formed
by intersecting multiple random graphs! (Except of course the
trivial case where an ER graph intersects another ER graph.)
D. Intersection of random graphs
When using random graph models to study networks, sit-
uations arise where the notion of adjacency between nodes
reflects multiple constraints. This can be so even when dealing
with networks other than WSNs. As was the case here, such
circumstances call for studying models which are constructed
by taking the intersection of multiple random graphs. However,
as pointed out earlier, the availability of results for each
component model does not necessarily imply the availability
of results for the intersection of these models; see the examples
provided in the previous section.
Figures 5-7 can help better understand the relevant issues
as to why this is so: Figure 5 provides a sample of an ER
graph G(n, p) with n = 200 and p = 0.2. As would be
expected from the classical results, the obtained graph is very
densely connected. Similarly, Figure 6 provides a sample of
the pairwise random graph H(n;K) with n = 200 and K = 5.
In line with Theorem 5.1, the obtained graph is connected. On
the other hand, the graph formed by intersecting these graphs
turn out to be disconnected as shown in Figure 7.
Fig. 6. An instantiation of H(n;K) with n = 50 and K = 5.– The graph
is connected.
Fig. 7. The intersection H ∩ G(n; θ) of the graphs in Figure 5 and Figure
6 – The graph is disconnected as the marked nodes form a component!
To drive this point further, consider the constant parameter
case for the models H(n;K) and G(n; p), a case which
cannot be recovered from either Theorem 4.1 or Theorem 4.2.
Nevertheless, Theorem 5.1 yields
lim
n→∞
P [H(n;K) is connected] = 1, K ≥ 2
8while it well known [5] that
lim
n→∞
P [G(n; p) is connected] = 1. 0 < p < 1.
However, it can be shown that
lim
n→∞
P [H ∩G(n; θ) contains no isolated nodes] = 0 (19)
whence
lim
n→∞
P [H ∩G(n; θ) is connected] = 0 (20)
for the same ranges of values for p and K; for details see
the discussion at the end of Section X. This clearly provides
a non-trivial example (one that is not for an ER intersecting
an ER graph) where the intersection of two random graphs is
indeed a.a.s. not connected although each of the components
is a.a.s. connected.
VI. A PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
We prove Theorem 4.1 by the method of first and second
moments [14, p. 55] applied to the total number of isolated
nodes in H ∩G(n; θ). First some notation: Fix n = 2, 3, . . .
and consider θ = (K, p) with p in (0, 1) and positive integer
K such that K < n. With
χn,i(θ) := 1 [Node i is isolated in H ∩G(n; θ)]
for each i = 1, . . . , n, the number of isolated nodes in
H ∩G(n; θ) is simply given by
In(θ) :=
n∑
i=1
χn,i(θ).
The random graph H ∩G(n; θ) has no isolated nodes if and
only if In(θ) = 0.
The method of first moment [14, Eqn (3.10), p. 55] relies
on the well-known bound
1− E [In(θ)] ≤ P [In(θ) = 0] (21)
while the method of second moment [14, Remark 3.1, p. 55]
has its starting point in the inequality
P [In(θ) = 0] ≤ 1−
E [In(θ)]
2
E [In(θ)2]
. (22)
The rvs χn,1(θ), . . . , χn,n(θ) being exchangeable, we find
E [In(θ)] = nE [χn,1(θ)] (23)
and
E
[
In(θ)
2
]
= nE [χn,1(θ)] + n(n− 1)E [χn,1(θ)χn,2(θ)]
by the binary nature of the rvs involved. It then follows that
E
[
In(θ)
2
]
E [In(θ)]
2 =
1
nE [χn,1(θ)]
+
n− 1
n
·
E [χn,1(θ)χn,2(θ)]
(E [χn,1(θ)])
2 . (24)
From (21) and (23) we see that the one-law
limn→∞ P [In(θn) = 0] = 1 will be established if we
show that
lim
n→∞
nE [χn,1(θn)] = 0. (25)
It is also plain from (22) and (24) that the zero-law
limn→∞ P [In(θn) = 0] = 0 holds if
lim
n→∞
nE [χn,1(θn)] =∞ (26)
and
lim sup
n→∞
(
E [χn,1(θn)χn,2(θn)]
(E [χn,1(θn)])
2
)
≤ 1. (27)
The proof of Theorem 4.1 passes through the next two tech-
nical propositions which establish (25), (26) and (27) under
the appropriate conditions on the scaling θ : N0 → N0×(0, 1).
Proposition 6.1: Consider scalings K : N0 → N0 and p :
N0 → (0, 1) such that (10) holds for some c > 0. Assume also
that limn→∞ pn = p⋆ exists. Then, we have
lim
n→∞
nE [χn,1(θn)] =

0 if c > τ(p⋆)
∞ if c < τ(p⋆)
(28)
where the threshold τ(p⋆) is given by (9).
A proof of Proposition 6.1 is given in Section VIII.
Proposition 6.2: Consider scalings K : N0 → N0 and p :
N0 → (0, 1) such that (10) holds for some c > 0. Assume also
that limn→∞ pn = p⋆ exists. Then, we have (27) whenever
p⋆ < 1.
A proof of Proposition 6.2 can be found in Section
X. To complete the proof of Theorem 4.1, pick a scaling
θ : N0 → N0 × (0, 1) such that (10) holds for some
c > 0 and limn→∞ pn = p⋆ exists. Under the condition
c > τ(p⋆) we get (25) from Proposition 6.1, and the one-
law limn→∞ P [In(θn) = 0] = 1 follows. Next, assume that
c < τ(p⋆) – This case is possible only if p⋆ < 1 since
τ(1) = 0 as seen at (9). When p⋆ < 1, we obtain (26) and (27)
with the help of Propositions 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. The
conclusion limn→∞ P [In(θn) = 0] = 0 is now immediate.
VII. A PREPARATORY RESULT
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider θ = (K, p) with p in (0, 1)
and positive integer K such that K < n. Under the enforced
assumptions, for all i = 1, . . . , n, we easily see that
E [χn,i(θ)] = E
[
(1− p)Dn,i
] (29)
where Dn,i denotes the degree of node i in H(n;K). Note
that
Dn,i = K +
n∑
j=1,j /∈Γn,i∪{i}
1 [i ∈ Γn,j] . (30)
By independence, since
|{j = 1, . . . , n : j /∈ Γn,i ∪ {i}}| = n−K − 1,
9the second term in (30) is a binomial rv with n−K− 1 trials
and success probability given by
P [i ∈ Γn,j] =
(
n−2
K−1
)(
n−1
K
) = K
n− 1
, (31)
whence
E [χn,i(θ)] = (1− p)
K ·
(
1−
pK
n− 1
)n−K−1
. (32)
The proof of Proposition 6.1 uses a somewhat simpler form
of the expression (32) which we develop next.
Lemma 7.1: Consider scalings K : N0 → N0 and p : N0 →
(0, 1) such that (10) holds for some c > 0. It holds that
nE [χn,1(θn)] = e
αn+o(1) n = 1, 2, . . . (33)
with
αn := (1 − cn) logn+Kn(pn + log(1− pn)) (34)
where the sequence c : N0 → R is the one appearing in the
form (12) of the condition (10).
In what follows we make use of the decomposition
log(1− x) = −x−Ψ(x), 0 ≤ x < 1 (35)
with
Ψ(x) :=
∫ x
0
t
1− t
dt
on that range. Note that
lim
x↓0
Ψ(x)
x2
=
1
2
.
Proof. Consider a scaling θ : N0 → N0 × (0, 1) such that
(10) holds for some c > 0 and assume the existence of the
limit limn→∞ pn = p⋆. Replacing θ by θn in (32) for each
n = 2, 3, . . . we get
nE [χn,1(θn)] = e
βn (36)
with βn given by
βn = logn+Kn log(1− pn)− γn
with
γn := −(n−Kn − 1) log
(
1−
pnKn
n− 1
)
.
The decomposition (35) now yields
γn := (n−Kn − 1)
(
pnKn
n− 1
+ Ψ
(
pnKn
n− 1
))
=
(
1−
Kn
n− 1
)
Knpn + (n−Kn − 1)Ψ
(
pnKn
n− 1
)
= −Knpn +
(
2−
Kn
n− 1
)
Knpn
+(n−Kn − 1)Ψ
(
pnKn
n− 1
)
= −Knpn + cn logn+ (n−Kn − 1)Ψ
(
pnKn
n− 1
)
where the last step used the form (12) of the condition (10)
on the scaling. Reporting this calculation into the expression
for βn we find
βn = αn − (n−Kn − 1)Ψ
(
pnKn
n− 1
)
.
Lemma 7.1 will be established if we show that
lim
n→∞
(n−Kn − 1)Ψ
(
pnKn
n− 1
)
= 0. (37)
To that end, for each n = 2, 3, . . . we note that
pnKn ≤ pn
(
2Kn −
K2n
n− 1
)
≤ 2pnKn
since Kn < n. The condition (12) implies
cn
2
logn ≤ pnKn ≤ cn logn, (38)
and it is now plain that
lim
n→∞
pnKn
n− 1
= 0 and lim
n→∞
(n−Kn − 1)
p2nK
2
n
(n− 1)2
= 0.
Invoking the behavior of Ψ(x) at x = 0 mentioned earlier, we
conclude from these facts that
lim
n→∞
(
(n−Kn − 1)
p2nK
2
n
(n− 1)2
)Ψ
(
pnKn
n−1
)
(
pnKn
n−1
)2
 = 0. (39)
This establishes (37) and the proof of Lemma 7.1 is
completed.
VIII. A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.1
In view of Lemma 7.1, Proposition 6.1 will be established
if we show
lim
n→∞
αn =

−∞ if c > τ(p⋆)
+∞ if c < τ(p⋆).
(40)
To see this, first note from (35) that for each n = 1, 2, . . .,
we have pn + log(1 − pn) ≤ 0 and the lower bound in (38)
implies
αn ≤ (1− cn) logn+ cn
(
logn
2pn
)
· (pn + log(1 − pn))
=
(
1−
cn
2
(
1−
log(1− pn)
pn
))
· logn. (41)
Letting n go to infinity in this last expression, we get
limn→∞ αn = −∞ whenever
c > lim
n→∞
2
1− log(1−pn)pn
= τ(p⋆) (42)
since limn→∞ cn = c.
Next, we show that if c < τ(p⋆), then limn→∞ αn = +∞.
We only need to consider the case 0 ≤ p⋆ < 1 since τ(1) = 0
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and the constraint c < τ(1) is vacuous. We begin by assuming
p⋆ = 0, in which case for each n = 2, 3, . . ., we have
αn = (1− cn) logn+Kn(pn + (−pn −Ψ(pn)))
= (1− cn) logn−KnΨ(pn)
= (1− cn) logn−
(
Ψ(pn)
p2n
)
·Knp
2
n
≥ (1− cn) logn− cn logn ·
(
Ψ(pn)
p2n
)
pn
= logn ·
(
1− cn
(
1 +
(
Ψ(pn)
p2n
)
pn
))
(43)
with the inequality following from the upper bound in (38).
Let n grow large in the last expression. Since we have assumed
limn→∞ pn = 0, we get
lim
n→∞
pn
(
Ψ(pn)
p2n
)
= 0,
and the desired conclusion limn→∞ αn = +∞ is obtained
whenever c < 1 = τ(0) upon using limn→∞ cn = c.
Finally we assume 0 < p⋆ < 1. For each ε > 0, there exists
a finite positive integer n⋆(ε) such that pn ≥ (1− ε)p⋆ when
n ≥ n⋆(ε). On that range the upper bound in (38) yields
Kn ≤
c
(1− ε)p⋆
· logn,
whence the conclusions K2n = o(n) and
pn
(
2Kn −
K2n
n− 1
)
= 2Knpn + o(1)
follow. Comparing this last fact against the lefthand side of
(12) yields
Knpn =
cn
2
logn+ o(1),
so that
Knpn ∼
cn
2
logn. (44)
From (34) it follows that
αn
log n
= (1− cn) +
(
1 +
log(1 − pn)
pn
)
·
Knpn
logn
for all n sufficiently large. Letting n go to infinity in this last
expression and using (44) with the earlier remarks, we readily
conclude
lim
n→∞
αn
logn
= (1− c) +
c
2
(
1 +
log(1− p⋆)
p⋆
)
= 1−
c
τ(p⋆)
where the last step follows by direct inspection. It is now
clear that limn→∞ αn =∞ when c < τ(p⋆) with 0 < p⋆ < 1.
The proof of Proposition 6.1 is now completed.
IX. NEGATIVE DEPENDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES
Fix positive integers n = 2, 3, . . . and K with K < n.
Several properties of the {0, 1}-valued rvs{
1 [j ∈ Γn,i] ,
i 6= j
i, j = 1, . . . , n
}
(45)
and {
1 [j ∈ Γn,i ∨ i ∈ Γn,j ] ,
i 6= j
i, j = 1, . . . , n
}
(46)
will play a key role in some of the forthcoming arguments.
A. Negative association
The properties of interest can be couched in terms of
negative association, a form of negative correlation introduced
to Joag-Dev and Proschan [15]. We first develop the needed
definitions and properties: Let {Xλ, λ ∈ Λ} be a collection
of R-valued rvs indexed by the finite set Λ. For any non-
empty subset A of Λ, we write XA to denote the R|A|-valued
XA = (Xλ, λ ∈ A). The rvs {Xλ, λ ∈ Λ} are then said
to be negatively associated if for any non-overlapping subsets
A and B of Λ and for any monotone increasing mappings
ϕ : R|A| → R and ψ : R|B| → R, the covariance inequality
E [ϕ(XA)ψ(XB)] ≤ E [ϕ(XA)]E [ψ(XB)] (47)
holds whenever the expectations in (47) are well defined and
finite. Note that ϕ and ψ need only be monotone increasing
on the support of XA and XB, respectively.
This definition has some easy consequences to be used
repeatedly in what follows: The negative association of
{Xλ, λ ∈ Λ} implies the negative association of the collection
{Xλ, λ ∈ Λ
′} where Λ′ is any subset of Λ. It is also well
known [15, P2, p. 288] that the negative association of the rvs
{Xλ, λ ∈ Λ} implies the inequality
E
[∏
λ∈A
fλ(Xλ)
]
≤
∏
λ∈A
E [fλ(Xλ)] (48)
where A is a subset of Λ and the collection {fλ, λ ∈ A}
of mappings R → R+ are all monotone increasing; by non-
negativity all the expectations exist and finiteness is moot.
We can apply these ideas to collections of indicator rvs,
namely for each λ in Λ, Xλ = 1 [Eλ] for some event Eλ. From
the definitions, it is easy to see that if the rvs {1 [Eλ] , λ ∈ Λ}
are negatively associated, so are the rvs {1 [Ecλ] , λ ∈ Λ}.
Moreover, for any subset A of Λ, we have
P [Eλ, λ ∈ A] ≤
∏
λ∈A
P [Eλ] . (49)
This follows from (48) by taking fλ(x) = x+ on R for each
λ in Λ.
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B. Useful consequences
A key observation for our purpose is as follows: For each
i = 1, . . . , n, the rvs
{1 [j ∈ Γn,i] , j ∈ N−i} (50)
form a collection of negatively associated rvs. This is a
consequence of the fact that the random set Γn,i represents
a random sample (without replacement) of size K from N−i;
see [15, Example 3.2(c)] for details.
The n collections (50) are mutually independent, so that by
the “closure under products” property of negative association
[15, P7, p. 288] [10, p. 35], the rvs (45) also form a collection
of negatively associated rvs.
Hence, by taking complements, the rvs{
1 [j /∈ Γn,i] ,
i 6= j
i, j = 1, . . . , n
}
(51)
also form a collection of negatively associated rvs. With
distinct i, j = 1, . . . , n, we note that
1 [i /∈ Γn,j, j /∈ Γn,i] = f (1 [i /∈ Γn,j ] ,1 [j /∈ Γn,i]) (52)
with mapping f : R2 → R given by f(x, y) = x+y+ for
all x, y in R. This mapping being non-decreasing on R2, it
follows [15, P6, p. 288] that the rvs{
1 [j /∈ Γn,i, i /∈ Γn,j] ,
i 6= j
i, j = 1, . . . , n
}
(53)
are also negatively associated. Taking complements one more
time, we see that the rvs (46) are also negatively associated.
For each k = 1, 2 and j = 3, . . . , n, we shall find it useful
to define
un,j,k(θ) := E
[
(1− p)1[k∈Γn,j ]
]
and
bn,j(θ) := E
[
(1− p)1[1∈Γn,j]+1[2∈Γn,j ]
]
.
Under the enforced assumptions, we have bn,3(θ) = . . . =
bn,n(θ) ≡ bn(θ) and un,3,1(θ) = . . . = un,n,1(θ) =
un,3,2(θ) = . . . = un,n,2(θ) ≡ un(θ).
Before computing either one of the quantities un(θ) and
bn(θ), we note that
bn(θ) ≤ un(θ)
2. (54)
This is a straightforward consequence of the negative associ-
ation of the rvs (45) – In (47), with A and B singletons, use
the increasing functions ϕ, ψ : R→ R : x→ −(1− p)x.
Using (31) we get
un(θ) = (1− p)
K
n− 1
+
(
1−
K
n− 1
)
= 1− p
K
n− 1
. (55)
An expression for bn(θ) is available but will not be needed
due to the availability of (54).
X. A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.2
As expected, the first step in proving Proposition 6.2
consists in evaluating the cross moment appearing in the
numerator of (27). Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider θ = (K, p)
with p in (0, 1) and positive integer K such that K < n.
Define the N0-valued rvs Bn(θ) and Un(θ) by
Bn(θ) :=
n∑
j=3
1 [j 6∈ Γn,1]1 [j 6∈ Γn,2] (56)
and
Un(θ) :=
n∑
j=3
1 [j 6∈ Γn,1]1 [j ∈ Γn,2] (57)
+
n∑
j=3
1 [j 6∈ Γn,2]1 [j ∈ Γn,1] .
Proposition 10.1: Fix n = 2, 3, . . .. For any p in (0, 1) and
positive integer K such that K < n, we have
E [χn,1(θ)χn,2(θ)] (58)
= (1− p)2KE
[
bn(θ)
Bn(θ) · un(θ)Un(θ)
(1− p)1[2∈Γn,1,1∈Γn,2]
]
where the rvs Bn(θ) and Un(θ) given by (56) and (57), respec-
tively.
A proof of Proposition 10.1 is available in Appendix A.
Still in the setting of Proposition 10.1, we can use (54) in
conjunction with (58) to get
E [χn,1(θ)χn,2(θ)] (59)
≤ (1− p)2KE
[
un(θ)
2Bn(θ)+Un(θ)
(1 − p)1[2∈Γn,1,1∈Γn,2]
]
.
It is plain that
2Bn(θ) + Un(θ)
=
n∑
j=3
1 [j 6∈ Γn,1] +
n∑
j=3
1 [j 6∈ Γn,2] .
We note that
n∑
j=3
1 [j 6∈ Γn,1] =
n∑
j=2
1 [j 6∈ Γn,1]− 1 [2 6∈ Γn,1]
= (n− 1−K)− (1− 1 [2 ∈ Γn,1])
= (n− 2−K) + 1 [2 ∈ Γn,1]
and
n∑
j=3
1 [j 6∈ Γn,2] = (n− 2−K) + 1 [1 ∈ Γn,2]
by similar arguments. The expression
2Bn(θ) + Un(θ) (60)
= 2(n− 2−K) + 1 [2 ∈ Γn,1] + 1 [1 ∈ Γn,2]
now follows, and we find
E [χn,1(θ)χn,2(θ)] (61)
≤ (1− p)2Kun(θ)
2(n−2−K) ·Rn(θ)
12
with
Rn(θ) := E
[
un(θ)
1[2∈Γn,1]+1[1∈Γn,2]
(1− p)1[2∈Γn,1,1∈Γn,2]
]
.
Next, with the help of (32) and (55) we conclude that
E [χn,1(θ)χn,2(θ)]
(E [χn,1(θ)])
2
≤
(1 − p)2K · un(θ)2(n−2−K)
((1− p)K · un(θ)n−1−K)
2 ·Rn(θ)
= un(θ)
−2Rn(θ)
= E
[
un(θ)
1[2∈Γn,1]+1[1∈Γn,2]−2
(1− p)1[2∈Γn,1,1∈Γn,2]
]
. (62)
Direct inspection readily yields
un(θ)
1[2∈Γn,1]+1[1∈Γn,2]−2
(1− p)1[2∈Γn,1,1∈Γn,2]
(63)
=

1
1−p if 2 ∈ Γn,1, 1 ∈ Γn,2(
1− pKn−1
)−2
if 2 6∈ Γn,1, 1 6∈ Γn,2
(
1− pKn−1
)−1
otherwise.
Taking expectation and reporting into (62) we then find
E [χn,1(θ)χn,2(θ)]
(E [χn,1(θ)])
2 (64)
≤
1
1− p
P [2 ∈ Γn,1, 1 ∈ Γn,2] +
(
1− p
K
n− 1
)−2
=
1
1− p
(
K
n− 1
)2
+
(
1− p
K
n− 1
)−2
(65)
by a crude bounding argument.
Now consider a scaling θ : N0 → N0× (0, 1) such that (10)
holds for some c > 0 and limn→∞ pn = p⋆ < 1. Replace
θ by θn in the bound (65) with respect to this scaling. It is
immediate that (27) will be established if we show that
lim
n→∞
1
1− pn
(
Kn
n− 1
)2
= 0
and that
lim
n→∞
(
1− pn
Kn
n− 1
)
= 1.
These limits are an easy consequence of the inequalities (38)
by virtue of the fact that limn→∞ pn = p⋆ < 1.
We close with a proof of (19): Consider θ = (K, p) with p
in (0, 1) and positive integer K . It follows from (32) that
lim
n→∞
E [χn,1(θ)] = (1− p)
K
e−pK ,
whence limn→∞ E [In(θ)] = ∞. It also immediate from (65)
that
lim sup
n→∞
E [χn,1(θ)χn,2(θ)]
(E [χn,1(θ)])
2 ≤ 1.
The arguments outlined in Section VI now yield
lim
n→∞
P [In(θ) = 0] = 0,
and this establishes (19). The conclusion (20) immediately
follows; see discussion at (66).
XI. A PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2 (PART I)
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider θ = (K, p) with p in (0, 1)
and positive integer K such that K < n. We define the events
Cn(θ) := [H ∩G(n; θ) is connected]
and
I(n; θ) := [H ∩G(n; θ) contains no isolated nodes] .
If the random graph H ∩G(n; θ) is connected, then it does
not contain any isolated node, whence Cn(θ) is a subset of
I(n; θ), and the conclusions
P [Cn(θ)] ≤ P [I(n; θ)] (66)
and
P [Cn(θ)
c] = P [Cn(θ)
c ∩ I(n; θ)] + P [I(n; θ)c] (67)
obtain.
Taken together with Theorem 4.1, the relations (66) and
(67) pave the way to proving Theorem 4.2. Indeed, pick a
scaling θ : N0 → N0 × (0, 1) such that (10) holds for some
c > 0 and limn→∞ pn = p⋆ exists. If c < τ(p⋆), then
limn→∞ P [I(n; θn)] = 0 by the zero-law for the absence
of isolated nodes, whence limn→∞ P [Cn(θn)] = 0 with the
help of (66). If c > τ(p⋆), then limn→∞ P [I(n; θn)] = 1
by the one-law for the absence of isolated nodes, and the
desired conclusion limn→∞ P [Cn(θn)] = 1 (or equivalently,
limn→∞ P [Cn(θn)
c] = 0) will follow via (67) if we show the
following:
Proposition 11.1: For any scaling θ : N0 → N0×(0, 1) such
that limn→∞ pn = p⋆ exists and (10) holds for some c > τ(p⋆),
we have
lim
n→∞
P [Cn(θn)
c ∩ I(n; θn)] = 0. (68)
The proof of Proposition 11.1 starts below and runs through
two more sections, namely Sections XII and XIII. The basic
idea is to find a sufficiently tight upper bound on the proba-
bility in (68) and then to show that this bound goes to zero
as n becomes large. This approach is similar to the one used
for proving the one-law for connectivity in ER graphs [5, p.
164].
We begin by finding the needed upper bound: Fix n =
2, 3, . . . and consider θ = (K, p) with p in (0, 1) and
positive integer K such that K < n. For any non-empty
subset S of nodes, i.e., S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we define the
graph H ∩G(n; θ)(S) (with vertex set S) as the subgraph of
H ∩G(n; θ) restricted to the nodes in S. We also say that S is
isolated in H ∩G(n; θ) if there are no edges (in H ∩G(n; θ))
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between the nodes in S and the nodes in the complement
Sc = {1, . . . , n} − S. This is characterized by
Σn,i ∩Σn,j = ∅ ∨ Bij(p) = 0, i ∈ S, j ∈ S
c.
With each non-empty subset S of nodes, we associate
several events of interest: Let Cn(θ;S) denote the event that
the subgraph H ∩G(n; θ)(S) is itself connected. The event
Cn(θ;S) is completely determined by the rvs {Ki(θ), i ∈ S}.
We also introduce the event Bn(θ;S) to capture the fact that
S is isolated in H ∩G(n; θ), i.e.,
Bn(θ;S)
:= [Σn,i ∩Σn,j = ∅ ∨ Bij(p) = 0, i ∈ S, j ∈ S
c] .
Finally, we set
An(θ;S) := Cn(θ;S) ∩Bn(θ;S).
The starting point of the discussion is the following basic
observation: If H ∩G(n; θ) is not connected and yet has no
isolated nodes, then there must exist a subset S of nodes with
|S| ≥ 2 such that H ∩G(n; θ)(S) is connected while S is
isolated in H ∩G(n; θ). This is captured by the inclusion
Cn(θ)
c ∩ I(n; θ) ⊆
⋃
S⊆N : |S|≥2
An(θ;S) (69)
A moment of reflection should convince the reader that this
union need only be taken over all subsets S of {1, . . . , n}
with 2 ≤ |S| ≤ ⌊n2 ⌋. A standard union bound argument
immediately gives
P [Cn(θ)
c ∩ I(n; θ)] ≤
∑
S⊆N :2≤|S|≤⌊n2 ⌋
P [An(θ;S)]
=
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=2
 ∑
S∈Nn,r
P [An(θ;S)]
(70)
where Nn,r denotes the collection of all subsets of {1, . . . , n}
with exactly r elements.
For each r = 1, . . . , n, we simplify the notation by writing
An,r(θ) := An(θ; {1, . . . , r}), Bn,r(θ) := Bn(θ; {1, . . . , r})
and Cn,r(θ) := Cn(θ; {1, . . . , r}). With a slight abuse of
notation, we use Cn(θ) for r = n as defined before. Under
the enforced assumptions, exchangeability yields
P [An(θ;S)] = P [An,r(θ)] , S ∈ Nn,r
and the expression∑
S∈Nn,r
P [An(θ;S)] =
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θ)] (71)
follows since |Nn,r| =
(
n
r
)
. Substituting into (70) we obtain
the key bound
P [Cn(θ)
c ∩ I(n; θ)] ≤
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=2
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θ)] . (72)
Consider a scaling θ : N0 → N0× (0, 1) as in the statement
of Proposition 11.1. Substitute θ by θn by means of this scaling
in the right hand side of (72). The proof of Proposition 11.1
will be completed once we show
lim
n→∞
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=2
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θn)] = 0. (73)
The means to do so are provided in the next section.
XII. BOUNDING PROBABILITIES
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider θ = (K, p) with p in (0, 1)
and positive integer K such that K < n.
A. Bounding the probabilities P [Bn,r(θ)]
The following result will be used to efficiently bound the
probability P [Bn,r(θ)].
Lemma 12.1: For each r = 2, . . . , n − 1, we have the
inequality
P
[
Bn,r(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,r] (74)
≤ (1− p)E
⋆
n,r · un(θ)
r(n−r)−E⋆n,r
with un(θ) defined by (55) and the rv E⋆n,r given by
E⋆n,r :=
n∑
i=r+1
r∑
ℓ=1
1 [ℓ ∈ Γn,i] . (75)
A proof of Lemma 12.1 is available in Appendix B. The rv
E⋆n,r, which appears prominently in (74), has a tail controlled
through the following result.
Lemma 12.2: Fix r = 2, . . . , n − 1. For any t in (0, 1) we
have
P
[
E⋆n,r ≤ (1− t)rK ·
n− r
n− 1
]
≤ e−
t2
2 rK·
n−r
n−1 . (76)
Proof. Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider a positive integer K
such that K < n. From the facts reported in Section IX, the
negative association of the rvs (50) implies that of the rvs
{1 [ℓ ∈ Γn,i] , i = r + 1, . . . , n; ℓ = 1, . . . , r}. We are now
in position to apply the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound to the sum
(75). We use the bound in the form
P
[
E⋆n,r ≤ (1− t)E
[
E⋆n,r
]]
≤ e−
t2
2 E[E
⋆
n,r] (77)
as given for negatively associated rvs in [10, Thm. 1.1, p. 6].
The conclusion (76) follows upon noting that
E
[
E⋆n,r
]
=
n∑
i=r+1
r∑
ℓ=1
P [ℓ ∈ Γn,i] = r(n− r)
K
n − 1
as we use (31).
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B. Bounding the probabilities P [Cn,r(θ)]
For each r = 2, . . . , n, let H ∩Gr(n; θ) stand for the
subgraph H ∩G(n; θ)(S) when S = {1, . . . , r}. Also let Tr
denote the collection of all spanning trees on the vertex set
{1, . . . , r}.
Lemma 12.3: Fix r = 2, . . . , n. For each T in Tr, we have
P [T ⊂ H ∩Gr(n; θ)] ≤ (pλn(K))
r−1 (78)
where the notation T ⊂ H ∩Gr(n; θ) indicates that the tree T
is a subgraph spanning H ∩Gr(n; θ).
Since pλn(K) is the probability of link assignment, the
situation is reminiscent to the one found in ER graphs [5]
and random key graphs [23] where in each case the bound
(78) holds with equality.
Proof. Fix r = 2, 3, . . . , n and pick a tree T in Tr. Let
E(T ) be the set of edges that appear in T . It is plain that
T ⊆ H ∩Gr(n, ; θ) occurs if and only if the set of conditions
Σn,i ∩ Σn,j 6= ∅
and
Bij(p) = 1
, {i, j} ∈ E(T )
holds. Therefore, under the enforced independence assump-
tions, since |E(T )| = r − 1, we get
P [T ⊂ H ∩Gr(n; θ)]
= pr−1 · E
 ∏
i,j:{i,j}∈E(T )
1 [Σn,i ∩ Σn,j 6= ∅]

= pr−1 · E
 ∏
i,j:{i,j}∈E(T )
1 [i ∈ Γn,j ∨ j ∈ Γn,i]

≤ pr−1 ·
∏
i,j:{i,j}∈E(T )
P [i ∈ Γn,j ∨ j ∈ Γn,i] (79)
by making use of (49) with the negatively associated rvs
(46). The desired result (78) is now immediate from (5) and
the relation |E(T )| = r − 1.
As in ER graphs [5] and random key graphs [23] we have
to the following bound.
Lemma 12.4: For each r = 2, . . . , n, we have
P [Cn,r(θ)] ≤ r
r−2 (pλn(K))
r−1
. (80)
Proof. Fix r = 2, . . . , n. If H ∩Gr(n; θ) is a connected
graph, then it must contain a spanning tree on the vertex set
{1, . . . .r}, and a union bound argument yields
P [Cn,r(θ)] ≤
∑
T∈Tr
P [T ⊂ H ∩G(n; θ)(S)] . (81)
By Cayley’s formula [16] there are rr−2 trees on r vertices,
i.e., |Tr| = rr−2, and (80) follows upon making use of (78).
XIII. A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11.1 (PART II)
Consider a scaling θ : N0 → N0× (0, 1) as in the statement
of Proposition 11.1. Pick integers R ≥ 2 and n⋆(R) ≥ 2(R+
1) (to be specified in Section XIII-B). On the range n ≥ n⋆(R)
we consider the decomposition
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=2
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θn)]
=
R∑
r=2
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θn)] +
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=R+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θn)] ,
and let n go to infinity. The desired convergence (73) will be
established if we show
lim
n→∞
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θn)] = 0 (82)
for each r = 2, 3, . . . and
lim
n→∞
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=R+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θn)] = 0. (83)
We establish (82) and (83) in turn. Throughout, we make
use of the standard bounds(
n
r
)
≤
(en
r
)r
, r = 1, . . . , n (84)
for each n = 2, 3, . . ..
A. Establishing (82)
Fix r = 2, 3, . . . and consider n = 2, 3, . . . such that r < n.
Also let θ = (K, p) with p in (0, 1) and positive integer K
such that K < n. With (75) in mind, for each i = 1, . . . , r,
we note that
n∑
k=r+1
1 [k ∈ Γn,i] =
n∑
k=1
1 [k ∈ Γn,i]−
r∑
k=1
1 [k ∈ Γn,i]
= K −
r∑
k=1
1 [k ∈ Γn,i] (85)
since |Γn,i| = K . The bounds
(K − r)+ ≤
n∑
k=r+1
1 [k ∈ Γn,i] ≤ K
follow, whence
r(K − r)+ ≤ E⋆n,r ≤ rK.
It is also the case that
r(n− r −K)+ ≤ r(n− r) − E⋆n,r.
Reporting these lower bounds into (74), we get
P
[
Bn,r(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,r]
≤ (1− p)r(K−r)
+
· un(θ)
r(n−r−K)+ (86)
≤ (1− p)r(K−r) · un(θ)
r(n−r−K)
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since 0 < p, un(θ) < 1. If we set
Fn,r(θ) := (1− p)
(K−r) · un(θ)
(n−r−K),
it is now plain that
P [An,r(θ)]
= E
[
1 [Cn,r(θ)]P
[
Bn,r(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,r]]
≤ P [Cn,r(θ)] · Fn,r(θ)
r . (87)
Applying Lemma 12.4 we find(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θ)]
≤
(
n
r
)
P [Cn,r(θ)] · Fn,r(θ)
r
≤
(en
r
)r
rr−2 (pλn(K))
r−1 Fn,r(θ)
r
=
1
r2
(en)
r
(pλn(K))
r−1
Fn,r(θ)
r (88)
as we make use of (84).
We also note that
Fn,r(θ) ≤ e
F⋆n,r(θ) (89)
with
F ⋆n,r(θ)
:= (K − r) log(1− p)− (n− r −K)p
K
n− 1
= (K − r) log(1− p)−
(
1−
K
n− 1
−
r − 1
n− 1
)
pK
= (K − r) log(1− p)− p
(
K −
K2
n− 1
)
+
r − 1
n− 1
pK
= K (p+ log(1 − p))− r log(1 − p)
− p
(
2K −
K2
n− 1
)
+
r − 1
n− 1
pK. (90)
Now, pick any given positive integer r = 2, 3, . . . and con-
sider a scaling θ : N0 → N0×(0, 1) such that limn→∞ pn = p⋆
exists and (10) holds for some c > τ(p⋆). Replace θ by θn
in (88) according to this scaling. In order to establish (82) it
suffices to show that
lim
n→∞
(en)r (pnλn(Kn))
r−1 · Fn,r(θn)
r = 0. (91)
For n sufficiently large, from (12) and (88) we first get(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θ)]
≤ (en)r (pnλn(Kn))
r−1 · Fn,r(θn)
r
= (en)r
(
cn
logn
n− 1
)r−1
· Fn,r(θn)
r
= en
(
ecn
n
n− 1
logn
)r−1
· Fn,r(θn)
r. (92)
On the other hand, upon making use of the bounds at (38),
we find
F ⋆n,r(θn) ≤ Kn (pn + log(1− pn))− r log(1− pn)
− pn
(
2Kn −
K2n
n− 1
)
+
r
n
pnKn
= Kn (pn + log(1− pn))− r log(1− pn)
− cn logn+
r
n
pnKn
≤ Kn (pn + log(1− pn))− cn logn
−r log(1− pn) +
r
n
cn log n
= pnKn
(
1 +
log(1− pn)
pn
)
− cn logn
− r log(1− pn) +
r
n
cn log n
≤
cn
2
logn ·
(
1 +
log(1 − pn)
pn
)
− cn logn
− r log(1− pn) +
r
n
cn log n
= −
cn
2
·
(
1−
log(1− pn)
pn
)
logn
− r log(1− pn) +
r
n
cn log n.
= logn
(
−
cn −
2rpn
logn
2
(
1−
log(1− pn)
pn
))
− rpn +
r
n
cn logn
≤ −
logn
2
(
cn −
2rpn
logn
)(
1−
log(1 − pn)
pn
)
+
r
n
cn logn. (93)
As a result, (90) implies
nFn,r(θn)
r (94)
≤ n1−
r
2 (cn−
2rpn
logn )·(1−
log(1−pn)
pn
)eo(1).
Under the enforced assumptions of Theorem 4.2 we get
lim
n→∞
(
1−
r
2
(
cn −
2rpn
logn
)
·
(
1−
log(1− pn)
pn
))
= 1− r
c
2
·
(
1−
log(1− p⋆)
p⋆
)
= 1− r
c
τ(p⋆)
< 0, (95)
and the desired conclusion (91) follows upon making use of
the inequalities (92) and (94).
B. Establishing (83)
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider θ = (K, p) with p in (0, 1),
and positive integer K such that K < n.
Pick r = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. By Lemma 12.1 we conclude that
P
[
Bn,r(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,r] ≤ (1− p)E⋆n,r (96)
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since 0 < un(θ) < 1, and preconditioning arguments similar
to the ones leading to (87) yield
P [An,r(θ)] ≤ E
[
1 [Cn,r(θ)] (1− p)
E⋆n,r
]
.
The event Cn,r(θ) depends only on Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,r whereas
E⋆n,r is determined solely by Γn,r+1, . . . ,Γn,n. Thus, the
event Cn,r(θ) is independent of the rv (1− p)E
⋆
n,r under the
enforced assumptions, whence
P [An,r(θ)] ≤ P [Cn,r(θ)]E
[
(1− p)E
⋆
n,r
]
. (97)
Pick t arbitrary in (0, 1) and recall Lemma 12.2. A simple
decomposition argument shows that
E
[
(1− p)E
⋆
n,r
]
≤ E
[
(1− p)E
⋆
n,r 1
[
E⋆n,r > (1− t)rK ·
n− r
n− 1
]]
+ P
[
E⋆n,r ≤ (1 − t)rK ·
n− r
n− 1
]
≤ (1− p)(1−t)rK·
n−r
n−1 + e−
t2
2 rK·
n−r
n−1
≤ e−(1−t)rpK·
n−r
n−1 + e−
t2
2 rK·
n−r
n−1
≤ e−(1−t)rpK·
n−r
n−1 + e−
t2
2 rpK·
n−r
n−1 .
Therefore, whenever r = 2, 3, . . . , ⌊n2 ⌋, we have
E
[
(1− p)E
⋆
n,r
]
≤ e−
1−t
2 ·rpK + e−
t2
4 ·rpK (98)
since on that range we have
n− r
n− 1
≥
n/2
n− 1
≥
1
2
.
Now consider a scaling θ : N0 → N0 × (0, 1) such that
limn→∞ pn = p
⋆ exists and (10) holds for some c > τ(p⋆).
Replace θ by θn in both (97) and (98) according to this scaling
and use the bound of Lemma 12.4 in the resulting inequalities.
Pick an integer R ≥ 2 (to be further specified shortly) and for
n ≥ 2(R+ 1) note that
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=R+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θn)]
≤
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=R+1
(
n
r
)
rr−2 (pnλn(Kn))
r−1
e−
1−t
2 ·rpnKn
+
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=R+1
(
n
r
)
rr−2 (pnλn(Kn))
r−1
e−
t2
4 ·rpnKn
≤
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=R+1
en
(
ecn
n
n− 1
log n
)r−1
e−
1−t
2 ·rpnKn
+
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=R+1
en
(
ecn
n
n− 1
logn
)r−1
e−
t2
4 ·rpnKn
by the same arguments as the ones leading to (92). Upon
invoking the lower bound in (38) we now conclude for all
sufficiently large n > 2(R+ 1) that
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=R+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θn)]
≤
⌊n
2
⌋∑
r=R+1
en
(
ecn
n
n− 1
log n
)r
e−
1−t
4 ·rcn logn
+
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=R+1
en
(
ecn
n
n− 1
logn
)r
e−
t2
8 ·rcn logn.
≤
∞∑
r=R+1
en
(
ecn
n
n− 1
log n · n−
1−t
4 ·cn
)r
+
∞∑
r=R+1
en
(
ecn
n
n− 1
logn · n−
t2
8 ·cn
)r
.
Furthermore, for all sufficiently large n ≥ 2(R+1) it also the
case that
ecn
n
n− 1
logn ·max
(
n−
1−t
4 cn , n−
t2
8 cn
)
< 1 (99)
and the two infinite series converge. Let n⋆(R) denote any
integer larger than 2(R + 1) such that (99) holds for all n ≥
n⋆(R). On that range, by our earlier discussion we get
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=R+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(θn)] ≤ e
(
ecn
n
n− 1
logn
)R+1
(. . .)
with
. . . :=
n1−
1−t
4 cn(R+1)
1− ecn
n
n−1 logn · n
− 1−t4 cn
+
n1−
t2
8 cn(R+1)
1− ecn
n
n−1 logn · n
− t
2
8 cn
.
Finally, let n go to infinity in this last expression: The
desired conclusion (83) follows whenever the conditions (1−
t)c(R+ 1) > 4 and c(R+ 1)t2 > 8 are satisfied. This can be
achieved by taking R so that
R+ 1 > max
(
4
c(1− t)
,
8
ct2
)
.
This is always feasible for any given t in (0, 1) by taking R
sufficiently large.
APPENDIX A
A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10.1
The basis for deriving (58) lies in the observation that nodes
1 and 2 are both isolated in H ∩G(n; θ) if and only if each
edge in H(n;K) incident to one of these nodes is not present
in G(n; p). Thus, χn,1(θ) = χn,2(θ) = 1 if and only if both
sets of conditions
B1j(p) = 0 if Σn,1 ∩Σn,j 6= ∅, j ∈ N−1
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and
B2k(p) = 0 if Σn,2 ∩ Σn,k 6= ∅, k ∈ N−2
hold.
To formalize this observation, we introduce the random sets
Nn,1(θ) and Nn,2(θ) defined by
Nn,1(θ) := {j = 3, . . . , n : j ∈ Γn,1 ∨ 1 ∈ Γn,j} (100)
and
Nn,2(θ) := {k = 3, . . . , n : k ∈ Γn,2 ∨ 2 ∈ Γn,k}. (101)
Thus, node j in Nn,1(θ) is neither node 1 nor node 2, and is K-
adjacent to node 1. Similarly, node k in Nn,2(θ) is neither node
1 nor node 2, and is K-adjacent to node 2. Let Zn(θ) denote
the total number of edges in H(n;K) which are incident to
either node 1 or node 2. It is plain that
Zn(θ) = |Nn,1(θ)| + |Nn,2(θ)|
+ 1 [2 ∈ Γn,1 ∨ 1 ∈ Γn,2] (102)
with the last term accounting for the possibility that nodes
1 and 2 are K-adjacent. By conditioning on the rvs
Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,n, we readily conclude that
E [χn,1(θ)χn,2(θ)] = E
[
(1− p)Zn(θ)
]
(103)
under the enforced independence of the collections of rvs
{Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,n} and {Bij(p), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}.
To proceed we need to assess the various contributions to
Zn(θ): Using (1) we find
|Nn,1(θ)| =
n∑
j=3
1 [j ∈ Γn,1 ∨ 1 ∈ Γn,j ]
=
n∑
j=3
1 [j ∈ Γn,1] +
n∑
j=3
1 [1 ∈ Γn,j]
−
n∑
j=3
1 [j ∈ Γn,1, 1 ∈ Γn,j ]
=
n∑
j=3
1 [j ∈ Γn,1] +
n∑
j=3
1 [j 6∈ Γn,1, 1 ∈ Γn,j ]
= K − 1 [2 ∈ Γn,1]
+
n∑
j=3
1 [j 6∈ Γn,1, 1 ∈ Γn,j ] (104)
where the last step used the fact |Γn,1| = K . Similar
arguments show that
|Nn,2(θ)| =
n∑
k=3
1 [k ∈ Γn,2 ∨ 2 ∈ Γn,k]
= K − 1 [1 ∈ Γn,2]
+
n∑
k=3
1 [k 6∈ Γn,2, 2 ∈ Γn,k] . (105)
As a result, from the definition of Zn(θ) we get
Zn(θ) = 2K − 1 [2 ∈ Γn,1, 1 ∈ Γn,2] + Z
⋆
n(θ) (106)
upon using (1) one more time, where
Z⋆n(θ) :=
n∑
j=3
1 [j 6∈ Γn,1, 1 ∈ Γn,j ]
+
n∑
j=3
1 [j 6∈ Γn,2, 2 ∈ Γn,j] . (107)
In order to evaluate the expression (103), we first compute
the conditional expectation
E
[
(1− p)Zn(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1, Γn,2] . (108)
From (106) we see that this quantity can be evaluated as the
product of the two terms
(1 − p)2K−(1[2∈Γn,1,1∈Γn,2]) (109)
and
E
[
(1− p)Z
⋆
n(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1, Γn,2] . (110)
To evaluate this last conditional expectation, for each j =
3, . . . , n, we set
Vn,j(θ;S, T )
:= E
[
(1− p)1[j 6∈S, 1∈Γn,j]+1[j 6∈T, 2∈Γn,j]
]
with S and T subsets of N , each being of size K . It is
straightforward to check that
Vn,j(θ;S, T )
= 1 [j 6∈ S]1 [j 6∈ T ]E
[
(1− p)1[1∈Γn,j ]+1[2∈Γn,j ]
]
+1 [j 6∈ S]1 [j ∈ T ]E
[
(1 − p)1[1∈Γn,j ]
]
+1 [j 6∈ T ]1 [j ∈ S]E
[
(1 − p)1[2∈Γn,j ]
]
+1 [j ∈ S]1 [j ∈ T ] .
Then, with the notation introduced earlier in Section IX, we
can write
Vn,j(θ;S, T )
= 1 [j 6∈ S]1 [j 6∈ T ] bn(θ)
+ (1 [j 6∈ S]1 [j ∈ T ] + 1 [j 6∈ T ]1 [j ∈ S])un(θ)
+1 [j ∈ S]1 [j ∈ T ] .
Next, the two rvs Γn,1 and Γn,2 being jointly independent
of the rvs Γn,3, . . . ,Γn,n, we find
E
[
(1 − p)Z
⋆
n(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1, Γn,2]
=
n∏
j=3
Vn,j(θ; Γn,1,Γn,2)
= bn(θ)
Bn(θ) · un(θ)
Un(θ) (111)
where the rvs Bn(θ) and Un(θ) are given by (56) and (57),
respectively. Therefore, since
E
[
(1− p)Zn(θ)
]
= E
[
E
[
(1− p)Zn(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1,Γn,2]]
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by a standard preconditioning argument, we get the expression
(58) upon writing (108) as the product of the quantities (109)
and (110), and using (111).
APPENDIX B
A PROOF OF LEMMA 12.1
The defining conditions for Bn,r(θ) lead to the representa-
tion
Bn,r(θ) = ∩
r
i=1 ∩
n
k=r+1 En,ik(θ)
where we have set
En,ik(θ) := ([k /∈ Γn,i] ∩ [i /∈ Γn,k]) ∪ [Bik(p) = 0]
with i = 1, . . . , r and k = r + 1, . . . , n. In terms of indicator
functions, with the help of (1) this definition reads
1 [En,ik(θ)]
= 1 [k /∈ Γn,i]1 [i /∈ Γn,k] + (1 −Bik(p))
−1 [k /∈ Γn,i]1 [i /∈ Γn,k] (1 −Bik(p))
= (1−Bik(p)) + 1 [k /∈ Γn,i]1 [i /∈ Γn,k]Bik(p).
Therefore, under the enforced independence assumptions,
P
[
Bn,r(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,n]
= E
[
r∏
i=1
n∏
k=r+1
W (1 [k /∈ Γn,i]1 [i /∈ Γn,k] ; p)
]
where
W (x; p) = 1− p+ px, x ∈ R.
Since W (x, p) = (1− p)1−x for x = 0, 1, we obtain
P
[
Bn,r(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,n]
= E
[
r∏
i=1
n∏
k=r+1
(1− p)1−1[k/∈Γn,i]1[i/∈Γn,k]
]
,
and it is now plain that
P
[
Bn,r(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,r]
= (1− p)r(n−r)Gn,r(Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,r; θ)
where we have set
Gn,r(S1, . . . , Sr; θ)
= E
[
r∏
i=1
n∏
k=r+1
(1− p)−1[k/∈Si]1[i/∈Γn,k]
]
with S1, . . . , Sr subsets of N , each of size K .
Next, we find
Gn,r(S1, . . . , Sr; θ)
= E
[
n∏
k=r+1
r∏
i=1
(1− p)−1[k/∈Si]1[i/∈Γn,k]
]
= E
[
n∏
k=r+1
(1− p)−
∑r
i=1 1[k/∈Si]1[i/∈Γn,k]
]
=
n∏
k=r+1
E
[
(1− p)−
∑r
i=1 1[k/∈Si]1[i/∈Γn,k]
]
as we again use the enforced independence assumptions. Fix
k = r + 1, . . . , n and note that
E
[
(1− p)−
∑r
i=1 1[k/∈Si]1[i/∈Γn,k]
]
= E
[
r∏
i=1
(
(1− p)−1[k/∈Si]
)1[i/∈Γn,k]]
≤
r∏
i=1
E
[(
(1− p)−1[k/∈Si]
)1[i/∈Γn,k]] (112)
=
r∏
i=1
E
[
(1− p)−1[i/∈Γn,k]
]1[k/∈Si]
where (112) follows from the negative association of the rvs
(45) – Use (48) and note that
(1− p)−1[k/∈Si] ≥ 1, i = 1, . . . , r.
Next we observe that for each i = 1, . . . , r, we have
E
[
(1− p)−1[i/∈Γn,k]
]
= (1− p)−1 P [i /∈ Γn,k] + P [i ∈ Γn,k]
= (1− p)−1
(
1−
K
n− 1
)
+
K
n− 1
=
un(θ)
1− p
whence
r∏
i=1
E
[
(1− p)−1[i/∈Γn,k]
]1[k/∈Si]
=
(
un(θ)
1− p
)∑r
i=1 1[k/∈Si]
.
Combining these observations readily yields
Gn,r(S1, . . . , Sr; θ)
≤
n∏
k=r+1
(
un(θ)
1− p
)∑r
i=1 1[k/∈Si]
=
(
un(θ)
1− p
)∑r
i=1
∑n
k=r+1 1[k/∈Si]
.
We finally obtain
P
[
Bn,r(θ)
∣∣∣Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,r]
≤ (1− p)r(n−r)
(
un(θ)
1− p
)∑r
i=1
∑
n
k=r+1 1[k/∈Γn,i]
and the desired conclusion (74) follows.
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